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REPORTS OF CASES
DETERMINED IN

THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA
[41 C.2d 1; 256 P.2d 984]

[L.A. No. 22087.

In Bank.

May 8, 1953.]

Estate of ARTHUR C. JAMISON, Deceased. CHANCEY
B. JAMISON, Respondent, v. FRANCES JAMISON
JOHNSON, as Guardian etc., et al., Appellants.
[1] Appeal-Decisions Appealable-Nonsuit.-Ordinarily a judgment of nonsuit is on the merits (Code Civ. Proc., § 581c), is
considered a final disposition of the case, and is appealable.
[2] Wills-Contest-Nonsuit.-A nonsuit as to some of the grounds
of a will contest does not dispose of the whole case but only
disposes of a portion of it, and thus there is the possibility of
two judgments in the same case (the one of nonsuit and the
other of a judgment at the close of the case on issues as to which
a nonsuit was denied), while the general rule is that there
should be only one judgment.
[3] Dismissal-Nonsuit-AppeaL-In reviewing a judgment of nonsuit, the test applied by the appellate court is whether, according to plaintiff the benefit of all favorable evidence together
with inferences therefrom it is sufficient to make a case,
whereas if the trial court sitting without a jury passes on the
weight of the evidence, even though the only evidence produced
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Appeal and Error, §§ 39, 50; Am.Jur., Appeal
and Error, § 82.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Appeal and Error, § 44; [2, 4, 5, 13]
Wills, § 512(1); [3] Dismissal, § 81(2); [6] Wills, § 118(1); [7]
Wills,§ 133; [8] Wills,§ 512(2); [9, 10] Wills,§ 109; [11] Wills,
§ 136; [12] Wills,§ 117; [14, 18] Wills,§ 76; [15] Wills,§ 63; [16]
Wills,§ 72; [17] Wills,§ 31; [19] Wills, § 541; [20, 21] Wills,§ 566.
( 1)
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[5]

[6]

[7]

[8]

[9]
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lw that of plaintiff, and
judgnwnt for dAfendant, the rule
on reviPw is that the PvidPn<:'P must bP viPwPd most faYorably
to defendant.
Wills-Contest-Nonsuit.---Jn a will contest tried before a jury
the proper procedure, rather than gTanting a motion for nonsuit on some of the grounds of contest, is for the court to instruct the jury to find for proponent on the issues on which
it thinks a nonsuit would be proper.
Id.-Contest-Nonsuit.-Where the grounds of contest of probate of a holographic will were (1) that the will was not
written and signed by decedent, (2) that it was executed under
the undue influence of proponent, and (3) that decedent was
mentally incompetent to execute it, and at the close of contestants' case proponent moved for a nonsuit on each and all
of the grounds of contest, and the court granted the motion
as to the first two grounds and denied it as to the third, and
then, after making a finding that decedent had the mental
capacity to execute the will but without making any finding
on the issue of undue influence, stated in its judgment that
decedent was not acting under undue influence, what was done
should not be considered as a true nonsuit but rather as a submission by proponent of question whether contestants' evidence was sufficient, and as a determination by the court that
it was not sufficient.
Id.- Undue Influence- Activity of Beneficiary.- Although
many factors, such as that decedent was estranged from a son
and that son received much more under a holographic will
executed shortly before decedent's death than he did under a
prior witnessed will, have a bearing on issue of undue influence, they are insufficient in themselves to establish such
influence; the son must also have been active in procuring the
execution of the will.
!d.-Undue Influence-Circumstantial Evidence.-Activity of
proponent in procuring execution of will may be established
by inference, that is, circumstantial evidence.
Id.-Contest-Nonsuit.-On review of that portion of judgment
in will contest which states that decedent was not acting under
undue influence and which is guided by same principles as pertaining in a nonsuit, that portion of proponent's testimony as
to delivery of will to him by decedent which is favorable to
contestants must be accepted and that which is unfavorable
rejected.
Id.- Undue Influence- Confidential Relations.- While consanguinity of itself does not create a fiduciary relationship as
a factor bearing on issue of undue influence, it is some evidence
of a fiduciary relationship.

[6] See Cal.Jur., Wills, § 76 et seq.; Am.Jur., Wills, § 390 et seq.
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[10] Id.- Undue Influence- Confidential Relations.- Although
there is evidence that decedent and his son, the principal
beneficiary in his will, had been estranged, where there is also
evidence that after decedent became ill and for several months
thereafter the son conscientiously visited his father, who
thought he was a good son and liked him, discussed his affairs
with him, and gave him papers dealing with finances to
examine, it could be inferred from the father and son relationship and such evidence that a confidential relationship
existed.
[11] !d.-Undue Influence-Review of Evidence on AppeaL-Although there is conflict in the evidence concerning many of the
circumstances relied on to show undue influence of proponent in
procuring execution of will, such conflict must be disregarded
on appeal where the sole question is whether the evidence most
favorable to contestants was sufficient as a matter of law to
establish undue influence.
[12] Id.- Undue Influence- Activity of Beneficiary.-Where a
fiduciary relationship is combined with unduly profiting by a
will, its being unnatural, and activity on part of proponent
in procuring its execution, there is persuasive evidence of undue influence.
[13] Id.-Contest-Nonsuit.-Where there is sufficient evidence on
the issue of undue influence to support a finding in favor of
contestants of will, a judgment of nonsuit on this issue will be
reversed.
[14] !d.-Testamentary Capacity-Review of Evidence.-If there
is any substantial evidence to support a finding that testator
was of sound mind and competent to make a will, it cannot be
disturbed even though there is a sharp conflict and abundant
evidence to support a contrary conclusion.
[15] !d.-Testamentary Capacity-Presumptions and Burden of
Proof.-A testator is presumed to have been sane or of
sound mind, and the burden of overcoming this presumption is
on the contestants.
[16] Id. - Testamentary Capacity- Opinion of Physician.-The
opinion of doctors who attended decedent in his last illness
that he was suffering from senile dementia and thus was of
unsound mind when his will was made is not conclusive on
the issue of competency.
[17] !d.-Testamentary Capacity-Adjudication of Incompetency.
-Incompetency to make a will is not necessarily established by
the fact that decedent was adjudged incompetent in a guardianship proceeding.
[16] See Cal.Jur., Wills, § 5 et seq.; Am.Jur., Evidence, § 1211.
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[18] !d.-Testamentary Capacity-Review of Evidence.-Where
conflict in evidence as to competency of testator to make a
will was resolved by trial court which weighed the evidence, its
conclusion is binding on appeal.
[19] Id.-Contest-Judgment.-A judgment in a will contest before probate stating· that the will is "entitled to be admitted
to probate" substantially complies with Prob. Code, § 373,
which provides that on proof taken by the court where a
jury is waived in such contest the court must render "judgment either admitting the will to probate or rejecting it,"
since nothing remains to be done.
[20] Id.-Costs.-Prob. Code, § 1232, declaring that "When not
otherwise prescribed . . . either the superior court or the
court on appeal, may, in its discretion, order costs to be paid
by any party to the proceedings, or out of the assets of the
estate, as justice may require," applies to will contests before
probate.
[21] Id.-Costs.-Court should not award costs in a will contest
until final determination of the contest, and hence should not
make an award where an appeal is taken.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County declaring that a holographic will was entitled
to be admitted to probate. John Gee Clark, Judge. Affirmed
insofar as judgment determined decedent was competent
when will was made, and reversed with directions insofar as
judgment determined that there was no undue influence; portion of judgment allowing costs, reversed.
Frederick W. Mahl, Jr., Edward Alton, Frank M. Sturgis
and Allan F. Bullard for Appellants.
Church, Church & Howard and Charles H. Church for Respondent.
CARTER, J.-Chance Jamison, respondent here, petitioned
for probate of the holographic will,* dated December 31, 1949,
of Arthur C. Jamison, his father. California Trust Com*''Dec 31-49
''I hereby revoke all past wills-codicils by me made-declare this
is my last will-I give H all my properties to my four heirs as followsLea Patterson
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2%
Frances Johnson ................................. 5%
Chance Jamison . . . .
..............
. . . . 85%
Louise Jamison . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
8%
''I appoint Chance Jamison as Executor of my will without bond
A. C. Jamison"
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pany petitioned for the probate of a witnessed will of the
decedent, dated May 17, 1948. Frances Johnson, decedent's
daughter, for herself and her two minor children; Leanore
Patterson, another daughter of the decedent, her children., and
Katharine Jamison, the divorced wife of respondent, :filed oppositions to the probate of the holographic will. Louise Jamison, surviving widow of decedent, did not oppose it. Under
the 1948 will, decedent had left $5,000 to each of his two
daughters, to respondent, his son, and to his brother Roy;
$15,000 to his wife, Louise; $50,000 to Katharine Jamison;
and the residue to his grandchildren. In the 1949, or holographic will, supra, he left 2 per cent of his estate to his
daughter, Leanore Patterson, 5 per cent to his daughter
Frances Johnson, 8 per cent to his wife Louise and the balance of 85 per cent to respondent, his son. The 1949 will revoked previous wills. Decedent left an estate of a stipulated
value of $237,000.
The grounds of contest of the probate of the holographic
will were: (1) That it was not written and signed by decedent;
(2) that it was executed under the undue influence of respondent; and (3) that the decedent was mentally incompetent
to execute it. Contestants abandoned the first ground on this
appeal, leaving only the last two. The case ,was tried by the
court without a jury.
At the close of contestants' case, respondent moved for a
nonsuit on each and all of the grounds of contest. The court
granted the motion as to the first two grounds and denied it as
to the third, mental capacity. The judgment at the close of
the case concluded that decedent had executed the 1949 will,
having the mental capacity to do so, had not then acted under
undue influence, and that the will was entitled to probate.
Contestants appeal from that judgment.
[1] The propriety of granting a motion for a nonsuit as
to some of the grounds of contest and denying it as to others
is doubtful when we speak of nonsuit in its true meaning.
That is so because ordinarily a judgment of nonsuit is on the
merits (Code Civ. Proc., § 581c), is considered a final disposition of the case and is appealable. (3 Cal.Jur.2d, Appeal &
Error, §§50, 39.) [2] A nonsuit as to some of the grounds
of contest does not dispose of the whole case but only disposes
of a portion of it. Thus there would be the possibility of two
judgments in the same case (the one of nonsuit and another
judgment at the close of the case on issues as to which a nonsuit had been denied) when the general rule is that there
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shonld be only one judgment. (3 Cal..Jur.2d, Appeal & Error,
§ 40.) This would raise the qner.:;tion of ~whether it would be
necessary to appeal from the first judgment of nonsuit on
some of the grounds of contest. [3] Further difficulties appear when we note that in reviewing a judgment of nonsuit,
the test applied by the appellate court is whether, according
to plaintiff (contestants) the benefit of all favorable evidence
together with inferences therefrom, it is sufficient to make a
ease, while if the trial court sitting without a jury, passes
upon the weight of the evidence, even though the only evidence
produced be that of plaintiff, and gives judgment for defendant, the rule on review is that the evidence must be viewed
most favorably to defendant. [4] In a case tried to a jury
the proper procedure, rather than granting a motion for nonsuit on some of the grounds, would be for the court to instruct
the jury to find for proponent on the issues upon which it
thought a nonsuit would be proper. (See Estate of Hewitt,
63 Cal.App. 440, 444 [218 P. 778] .) [5] What was done
in the instant case should not be considered as a true nonsuit.
Rather the respondent, proponent of the will, by his motion
for a nonsuit, in effect said to the court, "I do not wish to
put on any evidence to answer that produced by contestants
for I do not think their evidence is sufficient as a matter of law
to make a case on the first and second grounds and I am
willing that the court decide these issues on that basis-as
a matter of law, and refrain from weighing the evidence."
rrhe finding·s of fact made after all the evidence was in, show
that is what happened here because the trial court did not
make a finding on the issue of undue influence, the second
ground of contest, but, in its judgment, stated its conclusion
that decedent was not acting under undue influence. We
take that to mean that, as a matter of law, the court felt that
the evidence on that issue was not sufficient; that it had not
purported to weigh the evidence on that issue. Therefore on
that issue the scope of review must be the same as that on
a nonsuit, while on the finding of mental capacity the test
is whether there was sufficient evidence to support the finding.
Contestants' main contention is that the evidence when
viewed most favorably to them is sufficient to establish undue
influence and that the evidence is insufficient to support the
finding of mental capacity.
Turning first to the question of undue influence there is
evidence from which the following appears: The testator died
on February 11, 1950, at the age of 83, a month and 11 days
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after he made the 1949 holographic will. He had been married twice, his first wife having predeceased him. He left,
surviving him, his second wife, Louise; his son, respondent
here, and his wife, Esther; Katharine Johnson, divorced wife
of respondent, and Jeanne, their daughter; Leanore Patterson,
another daughter, and her four children, Jean, Patricia, Virginia and Robert; Frances Johnson, another daughter, and
her two children, Pranklin and Jacqueline ; Clare and Roy
Jamison, his brothers.
The testator had not been actively engaged in business
since 1930, except as to the investment of his money. He had
been well until the onset of the illness in May, 1949, which
culminated in his death. He was a family man and took an
active interest in his children and grandchildren. His first
wife died in 1945, and he married his surviving widow in
1948. Respondent and his father, the decedent, had been
estranged for many years, the latter being displeased with
the way his son conducted his life and felt that he was ''no
good.'' The testator had been a person of strong character
tending toward domination as the head of his clan. At the
onset of his last illness, he had adamantly maintained that
he would not go to a hospital and had remained at home for
a week. After he entered the hospital on May 20, 1949, he
became "docile." At the hospital he had a daily fever, his
gall bladder was diseased, he was anemic, and a heart ailment required medication and oxygen. He was suffering
from arteriosclerosis and senile dementia. He was mentally
confused and showed it in his actions. He could not add figures, indicating, contestants assert, that he could not have
computed the percentages in the holographic will. His personal physician testified that he was of unsound mind on
December 31, 1949, the date of the holographic will. He left
the hospital and returned to his home where he remained
until his death on February 11, 1950, still suffering from his
various ailments and under constant nursing care.
[6] There is thus a showing that decedent was in such
a mental condition on December 31, 1949, when the will was
purportedly executed, that he would be easily influenced; that
being estranged from respondent, his son, and being fond
of his grandchildren and daughters and his son's first wife,
it would not be probable that he would leave most of his
estate to respondent. There were aspects of unnaturalness
and undue profiting by respondent under the 1949 will, by
which he received much more than he did under the 1948

8
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will. 'l'hese are all factors bearing upon the issue of undue
influence. (Estate of Teel, 25 Cal.2d 520 [154 P.2d 384] ;
Estate of Lingenfelter, 38 Cal.2d 571 [241 P.2d 990] .) Of
course, standing alone, these factors are insufficient to establish undue influence. The proponent must also be active in
procuring the execution of the will. (Estate of Teel, supra,
25 Cal.2d 520; Estate of Lingenfelter, supra, 38 Cal.2d 571.)
[7] Such activity may be established by inference, that is,
circumstantial evidence. (Estate of Abert, 91 Cal.App.2d
50 [204 P.2d 347] ; Estate of Hannam, 106 Cal.App.2d 782
[236 P.2d 208] ; Estate of Leahy, 5 Cal.2d 301 [54 P.2d 704] ;
Estate of Sproston, 4 Cal.2d 717 [52 P.2d 924]; Estate of
Kilborn, 162 Cal. 4 [120 P. 762]; In re McDevitt, 95 Cal. 17
[30 P. 101]; see cases collected 26 Cal.Jur. 760-761.)
[8] In the instant case, according to respondent's testimony under section 2055 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the
will which was dated December 31, 1949, was handed to him
by decedent on February 7, 1950, 38 days after its date and
4 days before his death. This occurrence took place in decedent's home while respondent was visiting him, although
the decedent did not say, and respondent did not know, that
what was handed to him was a will. Decedent said he did not
have long to live, handed him the will and cautioned respondent not to show it to anyone. Respondent did not know
when the will was executed. On this review, guided by the
same principles as pertaining in a nonsuit, the portion of
such testimony favorable to contestants must be accepted and
that which is unfavorable rejected. The fact remains that
when the testator died, respondent had possession of the will
and offered it for probate.
There is evidence that respondent had an interest or motive
in having a will executed which would give him the major
share of the estate and that he had the opportunity to exercise
undue influence. In connection with the matter of opportunity, it appears, according to respondent's testimony, that
he visited his father frequently when he was ill in the hospital,
made almost daily visits after he had returned home and that
he was with his father several hours on December 31, 1949,
the date of the will, a part of which time he was with his
father alone.
In addition to the foregoing, contestants point to other
circumstances shown by the evidence: that decedent had a
great regard for his grandchildren, respondent's divorced wife,
and his children, with the exception of respondent, who he
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felt was "no good"-no son of his. (Decedent left respondent
$5,000 by the 1948 will as compared with 85 per cent of his
estate by the 1949 will which made no provision for his
grandchildren or respondent's divorced wife.) In May, 1949,
]'ranees Johnson, respondent's sister, told him that he was
to receive $5,000 under the 1948 will and his divorced wife
was to get $50,000. Later he was similarly advised and he
stated he was going to break the will. About August 1, 1949,
Frances and respondent were in Attorney Arkoff's office discussing the matter of having Frances appointed guardian of
decedent's estate and the testamentary disposition of his
property. Arkoff said decedent could make a will even though
a guardian was appointed and he explained how a holographic
will was made and executed. From this it may be inferred
that respondent was inquiring about that kind of a will although he had said he was not there to discuss wills. Respondent spoke to the testator and others about the testator's
making a new will (different from the 1948 will). On two
occasions, once while decedent was in the hospital, and once
when he was at home (September, 1949), respondent handed a
will in his own handwriting to his father for his signature.
This proposed will bequeathed the estate to decedent's three
children and revoked all previous wills. When it was
handed to decedent he said he would see about it and laid it
aside. Respondent then replaced it in his pocket. As above
seen, respondent was a constant visitor to his father after
his illness although they had previously been estranged. Respondent's second wife had formerly been a legal secretary,
and secretary to Giannini of the Bank of America, where she
may have acquired some legal knowledge. As far as appears,
respondent was the only person w'ho knew of the 1949 will
until after decedent's death. After his father's death, respondent had the bank's representative show him the 1948 will
without divulging his possession· of the 1949 will. Later he
delivered the 1949 will to his attorney. From this, it is asserted, that it may be inferred he was afraid to use the 1949
will because he knew it was invalid and would not have done
so if he had found the 1948 will to be favorable to him.
Contestants point out that the will is so concise and legally
complete that it is unreasonable to believe that the testator,
in his weakened condition, could have prepared it of his own
volition; that he was mentally incapable of listing the percentage each legatee would receive so that the various percentages would total 100 per cent, or his entire estate. Also,
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in the will itself shows it must

have bet>n a laborious ta::.;k for the writer.
li'inally it iR claimrd tlmt the

between testator
and respondent, that of father aml son, is a fiduciary relationship which is a factor in the question of undue influence,
citing Estate of Eakle, 33 Cal.App.2d 379 [91 P.2d 954].
To that case may be added Robins v. Hope, 57 Cal. 493, 497
and Baeon v. Soule, 19 Cal.App. 428, 434 [126 P. 384].
[9] However, this court said in Estate Lingenfelter, supra,
38 Cal.2d
585 : ''Consanguinity of itself does not create
a fiduciary relationship." It
however, some evidence of a
fiduciary relationship. (Estate of Llewellyn, 83 Cal.App.2d
534, 562 [189 P.2d 822, 191 P.2d 419] .) [10] While there is
evidence that respondent and his father had been estranged,
there is also evidence that after his father became ill and
for several months thereafter he had conscientiously visited
his father. The decedent thought he was a good son and
liked him, discussed his affairs with him and gave him papers
dealing with finances to examine. From the father and son
relationship and that evidence it could be inferred that a
confidential relationship existed.
[11] There is conflict in the evidence concerning many of
the foregoing circumstances as well as in the inferences
which may be drawn from them but, as seen, the sole question
is whether the evidence most favorable to contestants was
sufficient as a matter of law to establish undue influence, and
the conflicts must, therefore, be disregarded.
[12] The general rule is as stated in Estate of Teel, supra,
25 Cal.2d 520, 528: '' . . . where such fiduciary relationship is
combined with unduly profiting by the will, and its being unnatural, and activity on the part of the proponent in procuring
its execution, we have persuasive evidence of undue influence.''
While generally it is not fruitful to compare factually other
will contest cases because of the variation in existence and
degree of the factors involved, nevertheless Estate of De Laveaga, 165 Cal. 607 [133 P. 307] is quite persuasive. There
the testatrix was of weak mind (retarded development), had
lived for many years with her sister and her sister's husband
who had made all of her decisions for her. It was there held
that the relationship was a fiduciary one. The will there involved was holographic and precise in its form. The testatrix
left the bulk of her estate to her sister and only a small share
to her brother who contested it. According to the testimony
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of the sister-proponent, and her husband, on the date of the
will, the testatrix called them to her room and showed them
the will which she said she had written. The testatrix signed
it in their presence and handed it to the sister who kept it
until testatrix' death. The sister testified that they had exercised no influence. The probate court found in favor of the
contestant on the grounds of unsoundness of mind and undue
influence. This court affirmed the probate court on both
grounds, stating: ''The evidence is likewise amply sufficient
to sustain the finding of undue influence. Of course there can
be no claim that the evidence does not sufficiently show the
relation of trust and confidence between the deceased and
the Cebria1;1s, and the complete and perfect control of the
deceased by them. There was certainly sufficient proof of
interest and opportunity. The claim of learned counsel in this
regard is that there was no proof that any undue influence
was brought to bear directly upon the testamentary act. It
is well settled that 'undue influence, . . . must in order to
avoid a will destroy the free agency of the testator at the
time and in the very act of the making of the testament.
It must bear directly upon the testamentary act' (Estate of
Higgins, 156 Cal. 261 [104 P. 8); 'there must be substantial
proof of the pressure which overpowers the volition of the
testator at the time the will was made.' (Estate of Ricks,
160 Cal. 461-462 [117 P. 537] .) And to warrant the setting
aside of a will on this ground there must of course be substantial evidence of the exercise of undue influence on the
testamentary act. 'Substantial evidence must do more than
raise suspicion. It must amount to proof, and such evidence
has the force of proof only when circumstances are proved
which are inconsistent with the claim that the will was the
spontaneous act of the alleged testator.' (Estate of Ricks,
160 Cal. 462 [117 P. 537].) And it is said that the only
evidence as to the execution of this will was that given by
Mr. and Mrs. Cebrian, and that this evidence shows without
conflict that there was nothing in the way of influence, undue
or otherwise, attempted to be exerted upon deceased in the
matter. But the court was not bound to accept as true the
testimony of the Cebrians in this regard. If it was sufficiently
made to appear that the deceased was absolutely incompetent
to understandingly and intelligently consider her property
with a view to its proper disposition, and alone and unaided
to compose and write the paper offered for probate as her

12
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will, to warrant the trial judge in so concluding, as we have
seen is the fact, we have substantial proof of undue influence
bearing directly upon the testamentary act; and in view of
the testimony of Mr. and Mrs. Cebrian that they were the
only persons present at the time of the execution of the will,
taken in connection with the other matters to which we have
referred, it is certainly a reasonable, if indeed not an irresistible, inference, that whatever undue influence was in fact
exerted, was exerted by one or the other or both of them.
In addition to the matters already stated as being shown by
sufficient evidence, it is proper to note that the evidence
shows that Mr. Cebrian was a man of education, and one with
a considerable knowledge of law and legal forms; and also
that the alleged will indicated on its face that insofar as the
actual writing was concerned it was a laborious effort. As
said by the learned trial judge : 'It is quite plainly the product
of much manual exertion. If she was not following copy or
taking dictation, she was certainly engaged in hard work in
the writing of this will; it is not an example of fluency in penmanship nor of accuracy in spelling.' It is also proper to take
into consideration the improbability that deceased if she was
of sound and disposing mind and memory, and not acting
under undue influence, would have so discriminated against
her brother, who, in the language of the trial judge 'had been
a great service to her for many years and who had conserved
her estate without the diminution of a dollar, indeed with
increase and without retaining anything for personal benefit,' and of whom, as the evidence shows, she was very fond.''
(Estate of De Laveaga, snpra, 165 Cal. 607, 622.) [13] From
the foregoing discussion and authorities it appears that there
is sufficient evidence on the issue of undue influence to support a finding in favor of contestants and the judgment of
nonsuit on this issue must, therefore, be reversed.
On the issue of unsoundness of mind, there is testimony
by many witnesses, including several doctors, who were attending decedent, that the latter was of unsound mind and
did not know of what his property consisted on the date (December 31, 1949) stated in the 1949 will and at other times
near that date. A guardian was appointed for decedent in
late July or August of 1949, on the ground that he was incompetent to handle his affairs. The trial court found, nevertheless, that the testator was of sound mind and competent
to make the will.
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[14] If there is any substantial evidence to support that
finding it cannot be disturbed even though there is a sharp
conflict in the evidence and abundant evidence to support a
contrary conclusion. (Estate of Bristol, 23 Cal.2d 221 [143
P.2d 689]; Estate of Teel, supra, 25 Cal.2d 520.) [15] And
there is a presumption that the testator was sane-of sound
mind-which the contestants must overcome. (Estate of Lingenfelter, supra, 38 Cal.2d 571.) [16] The opinion of the
doctors who attended decedent in his last illness that he was
suffering from senile dementia and thus was of unsound mind
when the will was made is not conclusive on the issue of
competency. (Estate of McCollum, 59 Cal.App.2d 744 [140
P.2d 176]; Arais v. Kalensnikojj, 10 Cal.2d 428 [74 P.2d 1043,
115 A.L.R. 163] ; 20 Am.Jur., Evidence, § 1211; Estate of
Sandman, 121 Cal.App. 9 [8 P.2d 499].) [17] Incompetency to make a will is not necessarily established by the fact
that decedent was adjudged an incompetent in a guardianship
proceeding. (Hellman Commercial T. & S. Bank v. Alden,
206 Cal. 592 [275 P. 794] ; Estate of Loveland, 162 Cal. 595
[123 P. 801]; Estate of Johnson, 57 Cal. 529; Jensen v. Jensen,
84 Cal.App.2d 754 [192 P.2d 55] ; see In re Zanetti, 34 Cal.
2d 136 [208 P.2d 657].)
[18] Opposed to contestants' evidence is the testimony
of several witnesses, including the respondent, that testator
was of sound mind on the date borne by the 1949 will and
on prior and subsequent occasions. This testimony recounted
the rational behavior of decedent and showed that he was in
possession of his faculties. Also, the will itself bears mute
evidence of testator's competency. The conflict was resolved
by the trial· court which weighed the evidence and its conclusion is binding on this appeal.
[19] Contestants contend that the judgment is erroneous
in that it did not order the 1949 will admitted to probate.
Section 373 of the Probate Code provides that in a will contest before probate upon proof taken by the court where a
jury is waived, the court must render ''judgment either admitting the will to probate or rejecting it." Here the judgment states that the 1949 will is ''entitled to be admitted to
probate'' rather than that it is admitted to probate. On the
same day, the court made an order admitting the will to probate. No appeal was taken from that order. On respondent's
motion to dismiss the instant appeal, the District Court of
Appeal held that an order admitting a will to probate is not
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proper after judgment
a contest before probate
and that the
should order the will admitted to probate but it reserved the
as to the claimed error in
the
to be decided when the appeal was decided
on the merits (Estate of Jamison, 107 Cal..App.2d 483 [237
P.2d 546]). It is clear that the judgment substantially complies with section 373 of the Probate Code. When it declared
that the will was entitled to be admitted to probate nothing
remained to be done. Although it could have been worded
more precisely we find no substantial error.
[20] Contestants assert the court erred in awarding costs
to respondent, proponent of the 1949 will. The statute states:
''When not otherwise prescribed by this code or by rules
adopted by the Judicial Council, either the superior court or
the court on appeal, may, in its discretion, order costs to be
paid by any party to the proceedings, or out of the assets of
the estate, as justice may require." (Prob. Code, § 1232.) That
section applies to will contests before probate. (Estate of Jones,
166 Cal. 147 [135 P. 293]; Estate of Bwmp, 152 Cal. 271 [92
P. 642] .) [21] However, the court should not exercise its
discretion and award costs until the final determination of the
contest. Thus it should not make an award where an appeal
is taken. (Estate of Hart, 107 Cal.App.2d 58 [236 P.2d 891];
Estate of Jones, supra, 166 Cal. 147; Estate of Berthol, 163
Cal. 343 [125 P. 750] ; Henry v. Superior Court, 93 Cal. 569
[29 P. 230]; Estate of Johnson, 198 Cal. 469 [245 P. 1089],
200 Cal. 307 [252 P. 1052] ; Estate of Wallace, 12 Cal.2d 476,
481 [86 P.2d 95] .) Here the contest is not ended for, as appears, there must be a new trial on the issue of undue influence.
The judgment is affirmed insofar as it determines decedent
was competent when the 1949 will was made. It is reversed
insofar as it determines that there was no undue influence
and remanded for a new trial on that issue. The portion
allowing costs is reversed.
Each party shall bear his own costs on this appeal. (See
Hules on Appeal, rule 26 (a) . )
Gibson, C. ,T., Shenk, J., Traynor, J., and Schauer, J., concurred.
EDMONDS, J.-Recently, this court reiterated the long
established rule that '' ( t) o overturn a will on the ground of
undue influence, not only must there be evidence of activity
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on the part of the beneficiary, it also 'is necessary to show that
the influence was such as, in effect, to destroy the testator's
free ag·ency and substitute for his own another person's will.
. . . Evidence must be produced that pressure was brought
to bear directly upon the testamentary act . . . mere opportunity to influence the mind of the testator, even though
coupled with an interest or motive to do so, is not sufficient.' "
(Estate of L1:ngenfelter, 38 Cal.2d 571, 586 [241 P.2d 990] .)
The activity must be of such a nature that it "overpowered the mind and bore down the volition of the testator
at the very time the will was made." (Estate of Carithers, 156
Cal. 422-428 [105 P. 130] .) Moreover, it must be proved
by evidence in addition to that tending to establish such other
factors as unnaturalness of the will, motive by the proponent,
and susceptibility to influence on the part of the testator. As
I read the record in the present case, there are no facts from
which such conduct reasonably may be inferred.
The evidence relied upon by the contestants as giving rise
to such an inference shows only motive, unnaturalness in the
will, or the testator's susceptibility to influence, factors which
do not replace but are in addition to the requirement that the
proponent's activity in procuring the will be shown. Other
facts are mentioned in the majority opinion, but it is not
held that they are sufficient to support an inference of activity
which invalidates the testamentary document. Estate of De
Laveaga, 165 Cal. 607 [133 P. 307], is said to be "quite
persuasive'' of the conclusion reached but the facts of that
case clearly distinguish it from the present situation.
There, from childhood, the decedent had been incapable of
carrying on her own business affairs, entrusting all of such
matters to her brothers and sisters. Her sister, the proponent
of the will, directed all of her activities, the decedent obeying
without protest. Her mind was that of a child, "unable to
eomprehend anything beyond the most simple matters." It
was found specifically that she was incompetent mentally to
execute a will.
In addition, it was shown that the decedent had no knowledge of the nature or value of her property, but the will was
explicit in designating items and amounts. 'l'he proponent
and her husband, who with others managed her business
affairs, were alone with the decedent at the time the will was
executed. 'l'here was evidence that she signed any and all
papers which they presented to her, without inquiry as to
their nature and effect, and ''she never indicated her ability
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unaided to compose and write any paper beyond the simplest
and most childish messages, the few writings of any other
character shown, exclusive of the alleged will, having .been
produced with great and laborious effort and under such circumstances as to indicate the aid and assistance of others.''
(P. 621.)
Here, the evidence viewed most favorably to the contestants
shows only the following facts : Prior to the execution of
the will, Chance Jamison, each time in the presence of at
least one other person, sought twice to have the testator
revoke a previous will and execute a new one dividing the
estate among the children. Chance knew how to prepare a
holographic will. The mind of the testator was weak, but not to
such an extent as to justify a finding of mental incompetency.
The testator prepared a will which was concise and legally
complete, the appearance of which "shows it must have been
a laborious task for the writer.'' Chance and his wife visited
the testator on the day the will was executed, being alone
with him part of that time; the rest of the day he was either
alone or in the company of various other persons, no evidence
being offered as to the time of day the will was executed.
The most that can be said for this evidence is that it shows
a possible desire and opportunity to influence the testator to
prepare a new will. But to say that from such evidence it
may be found that the proponent ''overpowered the mind and
bore down the volition of the testator at the very time the
will was made'' is to permit the will to be overturned, not
upon proof, but upon speculation.
I would affirm the judgment in its entirety.
Spence, J., concurred.
Respondent's petition for a rehearing was denied June 4,
1953. Edmonds, J., and Spence, J., were of the opinion that
the petition should be granted.

